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THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEISM: A REPLY 
Alvin Plantinga 
Philip Quinn's "On Finding the Foundations of Theism"l is both challenging and important. 
Quinn proposes at least the following four theses: (a) my argument against the criteria 
of proper basicality proposed by classical foundationalism is unsuccessful, (b) the quasi-
inductive method I suggest for arriving at criteria of proper basicality is defective, (c) 
even if belief in God is properly basic, it could without loss of justification be accepted 
on the basis of other propositions, and (d) belief in God is probably not nowadays properly 
basic for intellectually sophisticated adults, There is much to be said about each of these 
four theses; I shall say just a bit about them. I take the fourth claim to be the most 
important and devote the most space to it. 
I. The Argument Against Classical Foundationalism 
In "Reason and Belief in God"2 (pp. 60-63) I argued that the criteria for proper 
basicality offered by classical foundationalism ancient and modem-are self-refe-
rentially incoherent. More precisely, what I said was self-referentially incoherent 
IS 
(34) P is rationally acceptable for S only if either (1) p is self-evident 
or evident to the sense or incorrigible for S, or (2) there are paths in 
S's noetic structure from p to propositions ql, ... , qn that (a) are 
basic for S, (b) are self-evident, evident to the senses, or incorrigible 
for S, and (c) support p (R&BG p. 61). 
(34) is the classical foundationalist's criterion for rational belief;3 and according 
to (34) a proposition p is rationally acceptable for a person S only if either p 
meets the classical foundationalist's conditions for being properly basic, or else 
p is believed on the basis of propositions that meet those conditions and support 
it. I argued that (34) is not itself either self-evident, evident to the senses, or 
incorrigible, and thus fails to meet the classical foundationalist's conditions for 
proper basicality. I added that if (34) is true, then if the classical foundationalist 
is to be rational in accepting it he must believe it on the basis of propositions 
that (a) are self-evident, evident to the sense, or incorrigible and (b) support 
(34). But no foundationalist, I said, has ever produced an argument for (34) 
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from propositions that meet those conditions; furthennore it is exceedingly hard 
to think of propositions that meet these conditions and support (34). I concluded 
that "It is therefore unlikely that the foundationalist's acceptance of (34) confonns 
to the necessary condition of rationality that (34) lays down" (R&BG p. 61). 
Now Quinn points out (p. 4) that, for all I said, it could be that the classical 
foundationalist accepts (34), his criterion for proper basicality, on the basis of 
propositions that are self-evident or incorrigible and support it, even if he can't 
tell us what those propositions are. This is quite correct; as I said in R&BG, 
that could indeed be, "Just as it could be that every theist accepts belief in God 
on the basis of propositions that both support that belief and are properly basic 
according to the classical foundationalist's criterion of proper basicality" (pp. 
61-62). I went on to say, however, that it seems unlikely in either case, so that 
in all likelihood classical foundationalists are indeed self-referentially incoherent; 
hence you and I would also be self-referentially incoherent if the classical foun-
dationalist succeeded in persuading us to adopt her criterion of rational belief. 
Here Quinn makes a most interesting move: he suggests a way in which, as 
he sees it, the classical foundationalist can rightly accept (34) on the basis of 
propositions that meet her conditions for being properly basic. Suppose we 
restrict our attention to the modern classical foundationalist, who holds that a 
proposition is properly basic if and only if it is either self-evident or incorrigible. 
Why, says Quinn, can't she adopt the broadly inductive procedure that (following 
Chisholm) I recommended for finding a criterion for proper basicality? She can 
assemble pairs of propositions and circumstances such that the propositions are 
properly basic in the circumstances, and other pairs where the propositions are 
not properly basic in the circumstances; she can then try to fashion a criterion 
that fits this evidential base. If she did, she would be accepting the resulting 
criterion on the basis of such proposition as P2 is properly basic in circumstances 
C2 , P3 is not properly basic in C3, P4 is not properly basic in C4 and so on; 
and these propositions would presumably provide inductive support for the 
criterion she endorses. Why couldn't she arrive at (34) by a process of this sort? 
The initial problem with this suggestion is that the propositions in her evidential 
base, i.e., such propositions as 
and 
(1) the proposition 2 + 1 = 3 is properly basic in circumstances C 
(2) the proposition there is a table before me is not properly basic in 
circumstances C 
do not seem to be either self-evident or incorrigible. But here Quinn suggests, 
interestingly enough, that perhaps such propositions are self-evident~r perhaps 
he is suggesting only that the classical foundationalist can sensibly take them to 
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be so: 
Suppose a modem foundationalist is contemplating believing that she 
is being appeared to redly in conditions optimal for visual experi-
ence .... Surely she can plausibly say that it is self-evident to her 
that that belief would be properly basic for her in those conditions . . . . 
Now suppose the same modem foundationalist is contemplating 
believing that Jove is expressing disapproval in conditions optimal for 
auditory experience in which she is being appeared to thunderously. 
Surely she can then plausibly say that it is self-evident to her that that 
belief would not be properly basic for her in those conditions ... (p. 
474). 
This is an interesting suggestion; but I doubt that it has much real promise. 
We have two questions: (a) can the modem foundationalist plausibly take such 
propositions to be self-evident? And (b) are such propositions really self-evident? 
An affirmative answer to (a) doesn't show that she isn't self-referentially incon-
sistent; it shows only that she can plausibly think that she isn't. But in fact I 
think the answer to both questions is negative. A belief is properly basic for a 
person at a time, in Quinn's words "just in case it is basic for the person at the 
time and its being basic for the person at the time is contrary to no correct canon 
of epistemic propriety and results from no epistemic deficiency on his or her 
part at that time" (p. 469). So to say that a belief is properly basic in a set of 
circumstances is to say that in those circumstances a person could accept the 
belief without either violating an epistemic duty or displaying some kind of 
noetic defect-the intellectual equivalent of a limp, saY,or an ulcer, or an astig-
matism. Now perhaps it is plausible to say that a proposition of the sort 
(3) S can accept p as basic in circumstances C without violating any 
epistemic duty 
can be self-evident; it isn't obvious that that kind of proposition can't be self-evi-
dent. But how can it be self-evident that a person could accept p in circumstances 
C without thereby displaying some kind of epistemic defect or deficiency? 
According to Freudians, theists accept their theistic beliefs because of a certain 
noetic defect, or deficiency, or dysfunction: Freud sees religious beliefs as "illu-
sions, fulfillments of the oldest strongest and most insistent wishes of mankind."4 
He adds that religion is the "universal obsessional neurosis of humanity"; it is 
destined to disappear when human beings learn to face reality as it is, resisting 
the tendency to edit it to suit their fancies. Now could a theist correctly or even 
plausibly claim that it was just self-evident that Freud was wrong here, and that 
theistic belief, in a given set of circumstances, is not a result of cognitive 
dysfunction? I don't think so. I can't see how a proposition to the effect that a 
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certain person on a certain occasion is suffering from no such defect can possibly 
be or plausibly be thought to be self-evident. 
Here Quinn makes the .following suggestion. Even though it is not in general 
self-evident that a person's intellectual or cognitive apparatus is functioning 
properly on a given occasion, it might still be self-evident that a particular belief 
in a particular set of circumstances does not arise as a result of cognitive misfunc-
tion: "Our modem foundationalist is supposed to be contemplating believing that 
she is being appeared to redly in conditions optimal for visual experience . . . . 
It seems quite clear to me that it could be self-evident to her that she would 
display no noetic defect in accepting that belief in those conditions" (p. 475). 
This doesn't seem clear to me at all; but neither does it seem clearly mistaken. 
There is indeed something special about such beliefs as I am being appeared 
to redly-something by virtue of which such propositions have been thought to 
be incorrigible. So suppose we concede for purposes of argument that such 
beliefs as 
(4) the belief that I am being appeared to redly in circumstances C is 
properly basic 
can indeed be self-evident. But this won't be nearly enough for the classical 
foundationalist. On Quinn's suggestion she must also suppose that such beliefs as 
(5) the belief that 2 + 1 = 3 is properly basic in circumstances C 
can be self-evident; she must accordingly suppose that it is self-evident that in 
those circumstances her intellectual or cognitive equipment is functioning prop-
erly in producing such beliefs in her. It would therefore have to be self-evident 
to her that, for example, her accepting these beliefs is not due to the malevolent 
activity of a Cartesian evil demon. I don't see how such a thing as that could 
possibly be just self-evident to her. 
But further, there are the negative members of the evidential base as well as 
the positive members; according to Quinn (4) is plausibly thought to be self-evi-
dent, but so is 
(6) the belief Jove is expressing disapproval is not properly basic in 
circumstances optimal for auditory experience. 
But if it is self-evident that this belief is not properly basic in those circumstances, 
then it must be self-evident that a person who accepted it in those circumstances 
would either be going contrary to an epistemic duty or be displaying a cognitive 
defect or malfunction in accepting it in those circumstances. It seems to me 
entirely clear that neither of these nor their disjunction could be self-evident to 
a human being. Obviously a person need not be going contrary to his epistemic 
duties in accepting the relevant proposition. Indeed, it may be impossible for 
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him not to accept the proposition on an occasion when he does accept it; our 
beliefs are not for the most part within our direct control. And how could it be 
just self-evident that in accepting such a proposition one would be displaying 
some cognitive misfunction? It is not self-evidently false that there is such a 
person as Jove; and not self-evidently false that he has created us in just such a 
way as to be aware of his disapproval upon being appeared to thunderously. So 
I don't think Quinn's suggestion provides much succor for the classical found-
ationalist. 
II. Epistemic Criteria 
Following Roderick Chisholm5 I argued (R&BG pp. 76ff.) that correct criteria 
of proper basicality, epistemic justification and allied notions are not self-evident; 
they should not be adapted a priori and handed down ex cathedra. Instead, they 
should be arrived at and argued for in a broadly inductive fashion: 
We must assemble examples of beliefs and conditions such that the 
former are obviously properly basic in the latter, and examples of beliefs 
and conditions such that the former are obviously not properly basic in 
the latter. We must then frame hypotheses as to the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of proper basicality and test these hypotheses by 
reference to those examples" (R&BG p. 76). 
Now here Quinn objects as follows: 
Plantinga's sketch of the first stage of a procedure for justifying criteria 
of proper basicality is ... well enough developed to permit us to see 
that it confronts at the outset at least one important difficulty. This is 
because, as Plantinga himself acknowledges, there is no reason to assume 
in advance that everyone will agree on what is to go into the initial 
set .... The difficulty, is, of course, that this is a game any number 
can play. Followers of Muhammed, followers of Buddha, and even 
followers of the Reverend Moon can join in the fun. Even the modem 
foundationalist can play (p. 473). 
Calvinists, Moonies, Great Pumpkinites-all can follow my prescription; and 
probably no two will arrive at the same criteria. Rhetoric aside, Quinn's point 
here seems to be the following. If this inductive procedure were correct, then 
different philosophers (and others) could quite properly employ it to arrived at 
different (and conflicting) criteria; for there is no reason in advance to assume 
that everyone who employs the method will agree on the initial sets of positive 
and negative examples. But then a criterion arrived at in this way cannot be used 
to settle the issue between, say, a Calvinist and a Great Pumpkinite. 
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This point is indeed correct, and one I meant to emphasize in 
R&BG:" ... there is no reason to assume in advance that everyone will agree 
on the examples" (77). But is there a difficulty here? 1 accept, indeed, insist 
upon this consequence, but fail to see that it is grounds for legitimate complaint. 
Different philosophers employing this method may arrive at different conclusions: 
true enough, but do we know of some reasonably viable philosophical method 
(for reaching epistemic criteria) of which this is not true? That's just life in 
philosophy. Relevant to the question of proper basicality, for example, is the 
question what sorts of beings human beings are: what sorts of things will they 
believe when their faculties are functioning properly, are not subject to noetic 
defect or deficiency? Here Aquinas and Freud will have radically different views; 
and these differences may be reflected in their criteria for proper basicality. That 
fact, however, doesn't show that they employed the wrong method for con-
structing their criteria of proper basicality. One or the other of them, of course, 
has a mistaken criterion; but (given their initial disagreements) each may have 
adopted the correct procedure for constructing such criteria. But the same holds 
with respect to the quasi-inductive method I recommended for coming to a 
criterion of proper basicality. It is indeed true that if people start with different 
beliefs as to which propositions are properly basic in various circumstances, then 
following the method I sketched, they may well come to different conclusions. 
But why think this is a defect in the proposed method? If it is, it is a defect this 
method shares with such paragons of propriety as deductive reasoning. Is there 
a method for arriving at criteria of proper basicality which can properly promise 
that all reasonable and responsible thinkers who follow it will arrive at the same 
conclusion? I know of no reason to think there is any such thing. 
III. Could Basic Belief Just As Well Be Non-Basic? 
One of my main aims in R&BG was to endorse the view that belief in God 
can be properly basic. Now Quinn concedes this may indeed be so; but even if 
it is, he says, it isn't of much moment: 
So, oddly enough, if certain propositions which self-evidently entail the 
existence of God can be properly basic for a person at a time, it is 
epistemically unimportant whether such propositions actually are prop-
erly basic for that person at that time. Without loss of any degree of 
justification, such theistic propositions can just as well be properly 
based, at least in part, on others which are descriptive of the person's 
experience at the time and are then properly basic for the person (p. 479). 
Quinn's views here have nothing specifically to do with beliefs about the 
existence of God; he is apparently prepared to say the same thing about beliefs 
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generally (or at any rate about perceptual beliefs). Thus he considers 
(8) I see a hand in front of me 
and 
(9) It seems to me that I see a hand in front of me. 
He holds that (8) is indeed properly basic in certain circumstances; but in any 
such circumstances, he argues, it could also be believed on the basis of (9) 
without loss of epistemic justification: 
If the proposition expressed by (8) were indirectly justified by being 
properly based on the proposition expressed by (9), it would be no less 
well justified than if it were directly justified by being directly grounded 
in visual experience. Since, by hypothesis, my visual experience in 
those conditions suffices to confer a certain degree of justification on 
the proposition expressed by (8), the amount of justification that reaches 
the proposition expressed by (8) from that experience will not be less 
in those conditions if it passes by way of the proposition expressed by 
(9) than if it is transmitted directly without intermediary (p. 478). 
I think Quinn is mistaken here. This is a large and complex issue, however, 
and here I can say only a bit of what needs to be said. We have two quite 
different suggestions as to how a belief like (8) could be justified, or acquire 
warrant, or have positive epistemic status. On one of these suggestions, such a 
belief gets justification by being believed on the evidential basis of other beliefs-
such beliefs as (9), for example. On this suggestion, one accepts (9) directly or 
immediately; one then believes (8) on the basis of (9), (9) serving as evidence-
deductive, inductive or abductive--for (8). (8) then acquires what warrant it has 
by virtue of being believed on the evidential basis of other propositions that 
already have warrant. On the other suggestion, a belief like (9) is taken as basic, 
believed in the basic way. Typically, such a belief is taken as basic in certain 
characteristic circumstances---circumstances including one's having the appro-
priate experience, or (to use Roderick Chisholm's terminology) one's being 
appropriately appeared to. Furthermore, when such a belief as (9) is taken as 
basic in these circumstances, it has positive epistemic status or warrant, and has 
it just by virtue of being formed in those circumstances. And Quinn's suggestion, 
so far as I understand it, is that if a belief acquires warrant in the second way, 
i.e., by virtue of being taken as basic in the right circumstances, then it could 
have acquired equal warrant by virtue of being believed on the evidential basis 
of propositions recording the experiences involved in those circumstances. 
Now this suggestion is true only if such propositions as (9) are in fact good 
evidence--deductive, inductive or abductive-for such propositions as (8). But 
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are they? I think not. The whole development of modem philosophy from 
Descartes to Hume and Reid shows that they are not. Thomas Reid was correct, 
I take it, in agreeing with Hume (as he understood him) that such beliefs as (9) 
do not in fact constitute much by way of (non-circular) evidence for such prop-
ositions as (8); if beliefs like (8) get what warrant they have by virtue of being 
believed on the evidential basis of propositions like (9), then they have little if 
any warrant. (The same should be said, says Reid, for memory propositions, 
propositions about the mental states of other persons, propositions accepted by 
way of testimony, and so on.) It is exceedingly hard to see how to construct a 
cogent argument--<ieductive, inductive, abductive or whatever-from experien-
tial beliefs (beliefs like (9)) to propositions which, like (8), entail the existence 
of such material objects as tables, houses, and horses. But if experiential prop-
ositions do not furnish much by way of evidence for such propositions as (8), 
then if such a proposition is believed on the basis of such experiential propositions 
(and has no other source of warrant or positive epistemic status) it will have 
little if any warrant. 
If doesn't follow, however, as Reid goes on to point out, that such propositions 
as (8) have little by way of positive epistemic status if taken as basic. Why, he 
asks, should we suppose that experiential propositions alone are a source of 
warrant or positive epistemic status, and that other propositions, if they are to 
have any of this commodity, must get it from them, by virtue of being believed 
on the basis of them? He goes on to argue that perceptual beliefs, memory 
beliefs, beliefs about the mental states of other persons (and still other kinds of 
belief) typically have a great deal of warrant-warrant they do not get by way 
of being believed on the evidential basis of experiential propositions. Reid claims 
that there is nothing but an arbitrary partiality in holding, as he takes Hume to 
hold, that only self-evident and experiential propositions are the sources of 
warrant. 7 
Reid's position, therefore, is two-fold. Such propositions as (8) get little if 
any warrant by virtue of being believed on the evidential basis of such propositions 
as (9); for the latter provide little evidence for them. Secondly, such propositions 
as (8), if taken as basic, typically have a good deal of warrant. 8 But then it 
follows, of course, that such propositions as (8), if taken as basic, can have 
much more by way of warrant or positive epistemic status if taken as basic than 
they could have if believed on the basis of such propositions as (9). 
I believe Reid is right here; but if he is, then Quinn is wrong. Quinn, indeed, 
has a sort of argument for thinking that (8) could have as much warrant if believed 
on the basis of (9) as it could if taken as basic: "Since, by hypothesis my visual 
experience in those conditions suffices to confer a certain degree of justification 
on the proposition expressed by (8), the amount of justification that reaches the 
proposition expressed by (8) from that experience will not be less in those 
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conditions if it passes by way of the proposition expressed by (9) than if it is 
transmitted directly without intermediary." but what is the reason for the "Since" 
here? In a given situation a certain proposition is properly basic for me; and it 
may be that it is properly basic for me partly because in that situation I am being 
appeared to in a certain way. Thus what justified me in believing the corresponding 
conditional of Modus Ponens, say, is my having a certain sort of experience; 
and no doubt Modus Ponens has a great deal of warrant for me. It does not 
follow, however, that my having that sort of experience is much by way of 
evidence for Modus Ponens; that I am appeared to in a certain way is weak 
evidence indeed, if it is evidence at all, for the truth of Modus Ponens. So there 
are two crucially different ways in which a proposition can acquire warrant for 
me: by virtue of being believed in the basic way in the right circumstances 
(circumstances perhaps including my being appeared to in a certain way), on 
the one hand, and by virtue of being believed on the evidential basis of beliefs 
about how I am being appeared to, on the other. These two are quite different. 
I can see no reason at all for supposing that these two processes are bound to 
yield the same degree of warrant. 
IV. Intellectual Sophistication and Basic Belief in God 
In R&BG I suggested that such propositions as 
(5) God is speaking to me, 
and 
(6) God disapproves of what I have done 
(7) God forgives me .for what I have done (numbering from Quinn's 
paper) 
are properly basic for at least some believers in God; there are widely realized 
sets of conditions, I suggested, in which such propositions are indeed properly 
basic. And when I said that these beliefs are properly basic, I had in mind what 
Quinn (pp. 20-21) calls the narrow conception of the basing relation: I was 
taking it that a person S accepts a belief A on the basis of a belief B only if 
(roughly) S believes both A and B and could correctly claim (on reflection) that 
B is part of his evidence for A. S's belief that there is an error in some argument 
against p will not typically b~ a belief on the basis of which he accepts p and 
will not be part of his evidence for p (See R&BG, pp. 84-85). 
This is important for the following reason. In arguing that belief in God is 
properly basic, I meant to rebut the claim made by the evidentialist objector: 
the claim that the theist who has no evidence for theism is in some way irrational. 
What the evidentialist objector objects to, however, is not just believing in god 
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without having a response to such objections to theism as the argument from 
evil. He concedes that the theist may perfectly well have an answer to that 
objection and to others; but as long as she has no evidence for the existence of 
God, he says, she can't rationally believe. As the evidentiaIist objector thinks 
of evidence, then, you don't have evidence for a belief just by virtue of refuting 
objections against it; you must also have something like an argument for the 
belief, or some positive reason to think that the belief is true. I think this 
conception of evidence is an appropriate conception; but in any event it is the 
relevant conception, since it is this conception of evidence that the evidentialist 
objector has in mind in claiming that the theist without evidence is irrational. 
As I see it, then, propositions like (5)-(7) are properly basic for many persons, 
including even such intellectually sophisticated adults as you and I. Quinn dis-
agrees: " ... I conclude that many, perhaps most, intellectually sophisticated 
adult theists in our culture are seldom if ever, in conditions which are right for 
propositions like those expressed by (5)-(7) to be properly basic for them" (p. 
481). Why so? I think Quinn is inclined to agree, first, that there are conditions 
in which such beliefs are properly basic for a person; such conditions might be 
those of a child brought up by believing parents, or perhaps of an adult in a 
culture in which sceptics had not produced the sorts of alleged reasons for 
rejecting theistic belief that are at present fashionable. The problem for intellec-
tually sophisticated adults in our culture, he says, is that many potential defeaters 
of theistic belief are available; and we have substantial reason to think them 
true. One kind of defeater for a belief (the kind Quinn is concerned with here) 
is a proposition incompatible with the belief; Quinn cites 
(12) God does not exist 
as a potential defeater of theism. And the problem for the intellectually sophis-
ticated adult theist in our culture, says Quinn, is that many substantial reasons 
for believing (12) have been produced. 
There are defeaters for theistic belief, then; and in the presence of defeaters, 
an otherwise properly basic belief may no longer be properly basic. More exactly, 
according to Quinn 
it seems plausible to suppose that conditions are right for propositions 
like those expressed by (5)-(7) to be ... properly basic for me only if 
(i) either I have no sufficiently substantial reason to think that any of 
their potential defeaters is true, or I do have some such reason, but for 
each such reason I have, I have an even better reason for thinking the 
potential defeater in question is false, and (ii) in either case my situation 
involves no epistemic negligence on my part (p. 483; call this principle 
'Q*'). 
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Quinn goes on to say that he is not in this fortunate condition with respect to 
theistic belief; he knows of substantial reason, he says, to think that (12) is true, 
and it is not the case that for each such reason he has, he has an even better 
reason for thinking (12) false. So (by Q*) belief in God is not properly basic 
for him; and he suspects the same goes for most of the rest of us. 
Now here I find myself in solid disagreement. We must first ask what these 
"very substantial reasons for thinking that what (12) expresses is true" (p. 481) 
are. What would be some examples of such substantial reasons for atheism? 
Quinn's answer: "After all, nontrivial atheological reasons, ranging from various 
problems of evil to naturalist theories according to which theistic belief is illusory 
or merely projective, are a pervasive, if not obtrusive, component of the rational 
portion of our intellectual heritage" (p. 481). So these substantial reasons for 
thinking theism false would be the atheological argument from evil together with 
theories according to which theistic belief is illusory or merely projective; here 
perhaps Quinn has in mind Marxist and Freudian theories of religious belief. 
I should remark immediately that the Marxist and Freudian theories he alludes 
to don't seem to be even reasonably cogent if taken as reasons for believing 
(12), or as evidence for the nonexistence of God, or as reasons for rejecting 
belief in God. Freud's jejune speculations as to the psychological origin of 
religion and Marx's careless claims about its social role can't sensibly be taken 
as providing argument or reason for (12), i.e., for the nonexistence of God; so 
taken they present textbook cases (which in fact are pretty rare) of the genetic 
fallacy. If such speculations and claims have a respectable role to play, it is 
instead perhaps that of providing a naturalistic explanation for the wide currency 
of religious belief, or perhaps that of attempting to discredit religious belief by 
tracing it to a disreputable source. But of course that doesn't constitute anything 
like evidence for (12) or a reason to think theism false. One might as well cite 
as evidence for the existence of God St. Paul's claim (Romans 1) that failure to 
believe in God is a result of sin and rebellion against God. None of the naturalistic 
theories according to which theism is illusory or merely projective seem to me 
to have any strength at all as arguments or evidence for the nonexistence of 
God-although they may be of interest in other ways. 
This leaves us with the atheological argument from evil as the sole substantial 
reason for thinking (12) true. And initially this argument seems much stronger 
as a reason for rejecting theistic belief. But is it really? Until recently, most 
atheologians who urged an atheological argument from evil held that 
(10) God exists and is omniscient, omnipotent and wholly good 
is logically incompatible with the proposition 
(11) there are 1013 turps of evil 
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(where (11) is just a way of referring to all the evil our world in fact displays). 
At present, I think atheologians have given up the clam that (10) and (11) are 
incompatible, and quite properly SO.9 What they now say is that (10) is unlikely 
or improbable with respect to (11); and Quinn (himself, of course, no atheologian) 
says, "What I know, partly from experience and partly from testimony, about 
the amount and variety of non-moral evil in the universe confirms highly for me 
the proposition expressed by (12)" (p. 481). But is this really true? Does what 
Quinn and the rest of us know about the amount and variety of non-moral evil 
in the world confirm highly the nonexistence of God? This is not the place to 
enter a discussion of that difficult and knotty problem (difficult and knotty at 
least in part because of the difficult and confusing character of the notion of 
confirmation); for what it is worth, however, I can't see that it does so at all. 
So far as I can see, no atheologian has given a successful or cogent way of 
working out or developing a probabilistic atheological argument from evil; and 
I believe there are good reasons for thinking that it can't be done. 10 I am therefore 
very much inclined to doubt that (11) "highly disconfirms" (10) for Quinn. At 
the least what we need here is some explanation to show just how (or even 
approximately how) this disconfirmation is supposed to go. 
So first, these alleged substantial reasons for rejecting theism warrant a good 
deal of scepticism. But secondly, even if we concede that there are such reasons, 
Quinn's conclusion won't follow; this is because (Q*), as it stands, is pretty 
clearly false. The suggestion is that if I have a substantial reason for thinking 
some defeater of a proposition (for example, it's denial) is true, then I can't 
properly take the proposition as basic unless I have an even stronger reason for 
thinking the defeater in question false. But surely this is to require too much. 
Suppose an atheologian gives me an initially convincing argument for thinking 
that (10) is in fact extremely unlikely or improbable on (11). Upon grasping this 
argument, perhaps I have a substantial reason for accepting a defeater of theistic 
belief, namely that (10) is extremely improbable on (11). But in order to defeat 
this potential defeater, I need not know or have very good reason to think that 
it is false that (10) is improbable on (11); it would suffice to show that the 
atheologian's argument (for the claim that (10) improbable on (11» is unsuccess-
ful. To defeat this potential defeater, all I need to do is refute this argument; I 
am not obliged to go further and produce an argument for the denial of its 
conclusion. Quinn takes 
(12) God does not exist 
to be a potential defeater for the propositions (5)-(7); but to defeat the potential 
defeater offered by an argument for (12) I need not necessarily have some 
argument for the existence of God. There are undercutting defeaters as well as 
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rebutting defeaters. II 
There is another and more subtle point here. Quinn seems to be thinking along 
the following lines: suppose I take some proposition as basic, but have substantial 
evidence from other things I believe for some defeater of this proposition-a 
proposition incompatible with it, let's say. Then (according to Q*) I am irrational 
if I continue to accept the proposition in question, unless I also have good 
evidence for the falsehood of that defeater. So if I accept a proposition p, but 
believe or know other things that constitute strong evidence for some defeater 
q of p, then, says Q*, if I am not to be irrational in continuing to accept p as 
basic, I must have a reason for thinking q false-a reason that is stronger than 
the reasons I have for thinking q true. 
Now my question is this: could p itselfbe my reason for thinking q false? Or 
must that reason be some proposition distinct from p? Consider an example. I 
am applying to the National Endowment for the Humanities for a fellowship; I 
write a letter to a colleague, trying to bribe him to write the Endowment a 
glowing letter on my behalf; he indignantly refuses and sends the letter to my 
chairman. The letter disappears from the chairman's office under mysterious 
circumstances. I have a motive for stealing it; I have the opportunity to do so; 
and I have been known to do such things in the past. Furthermore an extremely 
reliable member of the department claims to have seen me furtively entering the 
chairman's office at about the time when the letter must have been stolen. The 
evidence against me is very strong; my colleagues reproach me for such under-
handed behavior and treat me with evident distaste. The facts of the matter, 
however, are that I didn't steal the letter and in fact spent the entire afternoon 
in question on a solitary walk in the woods; furthermore I clearly remember 
spending that afternoon walking in the woods. Hence I believe in the basic way 
(13) I was alone in the woods all that afternoon, and I did not steal the 
letter. 
But I do have strong evidence for the denial of (13). For I have the same evidence 
as everyone else that I was in the chairman's office and took the letter; and this 
evidence is sufficient to convince my colleagues (who are eminently fairminded 
and initially well disposed towards me) of my guilt. They are convinced on the 
basis of what they know that I took the letter; and I know everything they know. 
So I take (13) as basic; but I have a substantial reason to believe a defeater 
of (13). According to Q*, if I am to be rational in this situation, I must have 
even better reason to believe that this potential defeater is false. Do I? Well, the 
only reason I have for thinking this potential defeater false is just (13) itself; I 
don't have any independent reason to think the defeater false. (The warrant I 
have for (13) is nonpropositionai warrant; it is not conferred upon (13) by virtue 
of my believing that proposition, on the basis of some other proposition, for I 
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don't believe (13) on the basis of any other proposition.) 
In this situation it is obvious, I take it, that I am perfectly rational in continuing 
to believe (13) in the basic way. The reason is that in this situation the positive 
epistemic status or warrant that (13) has for me (by virtue of my memory) is 
greater than that conferred upon its potential defeater by the evidence I share 
with my colleagues. We might say that (13) itself defeats the potential defeater; 
no further reason for the denial of this defeater is needed for me to be rational. 
Suppose we say that in this sort of situation a proposition like (13) is an intrinsic 
defeater of its potential defeater. When a basic belief p has more by way of 
warrant than a potential defeater q of p, then p is an intrinsic defeater of q-an 
intrinsic defeater-defeater, we might say. (A belief r is an extrinsic defeater-
defeater if it defeats a defeater q of a belief p distinct from r.) 
So my question here is this: how is Quinn thinking of these reasons for thinking 
the defeating proposition false? I am inclined to believe that he intends Q* to 
be read in such a way that these reasons have to be extrinsic defeater-defeaters; 
but if so, then his principle, I think, is clearly false. On the other hand, perhaps 
it is to be understood as saying something like 
Q** If you believe p in the basic way and you have reason to believe 
a defeater q of p, then if you are to be rational in continuing to believe 
p in this way, p must have more warrant for you then q does. 
I am not certain this principle is correct, but I am also not inclined to' dispute 
it. The central point to see, however, is that if a belief p is properly basic in 
certain circumstances, then it has warrant or positive epistemic status in those 
circumstances in which it is properly basic-warrant it does not get by virtue of 
being believed on the evidential basis of other propositions. (By hypothesis it 
is not believed on the evidential basis of other propositions.) To be successful, 
a potential defeater for p must have as much or more warrant as p does. And 
p can withstand the challenge offered by a given defeater even if there is no 
independent evidence that serves either to rebut or undercut the defeater in 
question; perhaps the nonpropositional warrant that p enjoys is itself sufficient 
(as in the above case of the missing letter) to withstand the challenge. 
But how does all this apply in the case in question, the case of belief in God 
and the alleged defeaters Quinn mentions? As follows. If there are circumstances 
in which belief in God is properly basic, then in those circumstances such belief 
has a certain degree of warrant or positive epistemic status. Now suppose a 
potential defeater arises: someone claims that the existence of 1013 turps of evil 
makes theism improbable, or he claims that theistic belief arises out of nothing 
more reputable than a kind of widespread human neurosis. Two questions then 
arise. First how does the degree of nonpropositional warrant enjoyed by your 
belief in God compare with the warrant possessed by the alleged potential defea-
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ter? It could be that your belief, even though accepted as basic, has more warrant 
than the proposed defeater and thus constitutes an intrinsic defeater-defeater. 
When God spoke to Moses out of the burning bush, the belief that God was 
speaking to him, I dare say , had more by way of warrant for him than would 
have been provided for its denial by an early Freudian who strolled by and 
proposed the thesis that belief in God is merely a matter of neurotic wish fulfill-
ment. And secondly, are there any extrinsic defeaters for these defeaters? 
Someone argues that the existence of 1013 turps of evil is inconsistent with the 
existence of God; I may then have an extrinsic defeater for this potential defeater. 
This defeater-defeater need not take the form of a proof that these propositions 
are indeed consistent; if I see that the argument is unsound, then I also have a 
defeater for it. But I needn't do even that much to have a defeater. Perhaps I 
am no expert in these matters but learn from reliable sources that someone else 
has shown the argument unsound; or perhaps I learn that the experts think it is 
unsound, or that the experts are evenly divided as to its soundness. Then too I 
have or may have a defeater for the potential defeater in question, and can 
continue to accept theistic belief in the basic way without irrationality. 
By way of conclusion then: Quinn claims that intellectually sophisticated adult 
theists in our culture are seldom in epistemic circumstances in which belief in 
God is properly basic; for they have substantial reason to think that some potential 
defeater of theism is true, and do not have, for each such defeater, even stronger 
reason to think it is false. But first, it isn't necessary that they have reason 
independent of their belief in God for the falsehood of the alleged defeaters. 
Perhaps the nonpropositional warrant enjoyed by your belief in God is itself 
sufficient to tum back the challenge offered by the alleged defeaters, so that 
your theistic belief is an intrinsic defeater-defeater. And second, extrinsic 
defeaters of the alleged defeaters need not be evidence for the falsehood of those 
defeaters; they may instead undercut the alleged defeaters; they may be, for 
example, refutations of atheological arguments. (And here Christian philosophers 
can clearly be of service to the rest of the Christian community.) My opinion 
(for what it is worth) is that for many theists, the nonpropositional warrant belief 
in God has for them is indeed greater than that of alleged potential defeaters of 
theistic belief-for example, Freudian or Marxist theories of religion. Further-
more, there are powerful extrinsic defeaters for the sorts of potential defeaters 
of theism Quinn suggests. The atheological argument from evil, for example, 
is formidable; but there are equally formidable defeaters for this potential defeater. 
I am therefore inclined to believe that belief in God is properly basic for most 
theists~ven intellectually sophisticated adult theists. 
University of Notre Dame 
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2. In Faith and Rationality. ed A. Plantinga and N. Wolterstorff (South Bend: The University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1983) (hereafter 'R&BG'). 
3. More exactly, the result of replacing 'only if' in (34) by 'if and only if' is the criterion of rational 
belief that results from combining ancient classical foundationalism with modem classical found-
ationalism: see R&BG pp. 58-59. 
4. The Future of an Illusion, XXI, 30. Compare Civilization and its Discontents (London: The 
Hogarth Press Ltd., 1930) e.g.p. 42:"At such a cost-by the forcible imposition of mental infantilism 
and inducing a mass-delusion-religion succeeds in saving many people from individual neuroses." 
5. See, e.g., The Problem of the Criterion (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1973). 
6. Here I should add that what I say about the proper way to arrive at criteria of proper basicality 
in R&BG needs supplementation and revision. For example, various constraints on such criteria 
may indeed be self evident; more important, there are theoretical constraints arising from one's 
general philosophical views as to what sorts of beings human beings are. 
7. "The skeptic asks me, Why do you believe the existence of the external objects which you 
perceive? This belief, Sir, is none of my manufacture; it came from the mint of nature; it bears her 
image and superscription; and, if it is not right, the fault is not mine: I ever took it upon trust, and 
without suspicion. Reason [i.e., the faculty whereby one comes to believe experiential propositions 
and self-evident propositions-A.P.] says the sceptic, is the only judge of truth, and you ought to 
throw off every opinion and every belief that is not grounded on reason. Why, Sir, should I believe 
the faculty of reason more than that of perception; they came both out of the same shop, and were 
made by the same artist; and if he puts one piece of false ware into my hands, what should hinder 
him from putting another?" (Inquiry into the Human Mind VI, 20). 
8. Perhaps the most impressive contemporary development of similar themes is to be found in the 
work of Roderick Chisholm; see again The Problem of the Criterion (Milwaukee: Marquette University 
Press, 1973). 
9. See for example Chapter IX of my The Nature of the Necessity (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 
1974). 
10. See my paper "The Probabilistic Argument from Evil," Philosophical Studies, 1980, pp. 1-53. 
II. lowe these terms to John Pollock. The distinction between undercutting and rebutting defeaters 
is of central importance to apologetics. If the propriety of basic belief in God is threatened by 
defeaters, there are two ways to respond. First, there is negative apologetics: the attempt to refute 
the arguments brought against theism (the atheological argument from evil, the claim that the 
conception of God is incoherent, and so on). Second, there is positive apologetics: the attempt to 
develop arguments for the existence of God. These are both important disciplines; but it is only the 
first, clearly enough, that is required to defeat those defeaters. 
